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ABSTRACT
Machine learning models are increasingly made available to the
masses through public query interfaces. Recent academic work has
demonstrated that malicious users who can query such models are
able to infer sensitive information about records within the training
data. Differential privacy can thwart such attacks, but not all models
can be readily trained to achieve this guarantee or to achieve it
with acceptable utility loss. As a result, if a model is trained without
differential privacy guarantee, little is known or can be said about
the privacy risk of releasing it.
In this work, we investigate and analyze membership attacks to
understand why and how they succeed. Based on this understand-
ing, we propose Differential Training Privacy (DTP), an empirical
metric to estimate the privacy risk of publishing a classier when
methods such as differential privacy cannot be applied. DTP is a
measure on a classier with respect to its training dataset, and we
show that calculating DTP is efficient in many practical cases. We
empirically validate DTP using state-of-the-art machine learning
models such as neural networks trained on real-world datasets. Our
results show that DTP is highly predictive of the success of member-
ship attacks and therefore reducing DTP also reduces the privacy
risk. We advocate for DTP to be used as part of the decision-making
process when considering publishing a classifier. To this end, we
also suggest adopting the DTP-1 hypothesis: if a classifier has a
DTP value above 1, it should not be published.
1 INTRODUCTION
Machine learning models are widely used to extract useful infor-
mation from large datasets and support many popular Internet
services. Companies like Amazon [1], Google [3], and Microsoft [2]
have started to provide Machine Learning-as-a-Service (MLaaS).
Data owners upload their data and obtain black-box access to a
classification model which can be queried through an API.
Recent academic work has pointed out several security and pri-
vacy issues with this MLaaS paradigm. Models can be stolen or
reverse engineered [42], sensitive population-level information can
be inferred [13, 14]; even the corresponding training datasets can
be targeted by inference attacks. In particular, Shokri et al. [37]
propose a membership attack to infer sensitive information about
individuals whose data records are part of the training dataset.
Membership attacks are not new or specific to MLaaS and are
known credible threats in various contexts such as in Genome-Wide
Association Studies (GWAS) [17]. In principle, membership attacks
are easily thwarted by ensuring that the model is trained using a
differentially private process. Unfortunately, it is not always feasible
to use a learning algorithm that satisfies differential privacy. Some
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classification models cannot readily be trained in this way, or doing
so may come at the cost of an unacceptable utility loss.
This issue is exacerbated by the fact that if a classification model
is trained without differential privacy, then little is known about its
membership privacy risk; there is a gap in our ability to analyze the
risk. At the same time, there is no reason to believe that all classifi-
cation algorithms leak the exact same amount about their training
datasets — a model that is badly overfitted has the potential to leak
more than one which is not. Yet there is currently no framework or
principled way to measure this in practice.
In this paper, we investigate why and howmembership inference
attacks succeed. We derive a general attack framework and perform
experiments on state-of-the-art classifiers trained on real-world
datasets. Our goal is to design a metric which reflects membership
privacy risk and can easily be calculated on a classifier.
We identify a simple measure called Differential Training Privacy
(DTP)which quantifies the risk of membership inference of a record
with respect to a classifier and its training data; the higher the DTP
value, the higher the risk. We extend DTP to a metric over the
classifier, by computing the DTP value of all records in the training
dataset and taking the maximum—the worst case risk. DTP is not
a substitute for a differentially private learning algorithm. Rather
DTP provides an objective basis for decision making. For example,
when two classifiers exhibit similar performance, it is preferable to
publish the one with the lowest DTP.
Informally, given a classifier A(T ) trained on a dataset T , the
membership leakage of a record t ∈ T is quantified by comparing
that classifier’s predictions to those of a classifier trained without
record t , i.e., A(T \ {t}). We assume black-box access, so an ad-
versary can only learn information by querying the classifier. In
this setting, membership attacks are predicated on distinguishing
whether the classifier was trained on T or T \ {t}. This is what
DTP measures. Differences in predictions can occur for any query,
but we initially focus on direct attacks which expect the maximum
difference to be observed when querying features of t .
We provide experimental validation of direct attacks on both
traditional classifiers such as naive Bayes and logistic regression
and state-of-the-art models such as neural networks trained on two
real-world datasets: a purchase dataset containing the shopping
history of 300,000 individuals, and the popular UCI Adult dataset.
Specifically, we perform several membership inference attacks on
these classifiers, including the most effective attack known. Results
suggest that DTP is a powerful predictor of the accuracy of direct
attacks. Concretely, for neural networks learned on the purchase
dataset, the Pearson correlation coefficient of the maximum mem-
bership attack accuracy with DTP is 0.8936. For classifiers with
DTP-values under 0.5, none of the attacks we performed ever in-
ferred membership status of any individual with accuracy greater
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than 66.5% (baseline: 50%). By comparison our attacks almost al-
ways have over 90% accuracy when DTP is larger than 4.
Althoughwe do not know of any practical indirect attacks—which
query the classifier for features other than those of t—we cannot
exclude the possibility that such attacksmay outperform direct ones.
In fact, we produce a counter-example that this is indeed possible.
We explore whether this situation occurs for known classification
algorithms and derive a set of theoretical results, including a simple
criterion (for classifiers) called training stability. For algorithms
which satisfy training stability, the direct attack is always superior
to any indirect attack.
Contributions. We propose Differential Training Privacy (DTP)
to quantify membership inference risk of publishing a classifier.
DTP is used to inform the decision of whether to release a classifier
when techniques to achieve differential privacy cannot be employed.
We advocate for the DTP-1 hypothesis: if a classifier has a DTP
value above 1, it should not be published. We test this hypothesis
by designing effective attacks on records with DTP greater than 1
based on different classifiers and datasets.
We present a general membership attack framework and evaluate
three types of attacks on several classifiers trained on two real-
world datasets, including the most effective attack known prior to
this work—which we improve upon. Our empirical study of the
relationship between the accuracy of membership attacks and DTP,
reveals the latter to be a powerful predictor of the former.
We establish training stability as an important desideratum for
classifiers, and prove that naive Bayes, random decision trees, and
linear statistical queries satisfy it but k-NN does not.
2 PROBLEM STATEMENT
Consider a data owner with a datasetD. We assume that the dataset
is divided into multiple classes and each record in the dataset con-
sists of a class label and a vector of features. We also assume that the
data owner randomly partitions the dataset into a training set and a
validation set. A machine learning model is trained on the training
set. The model captures the correlations between the features and
the class labels. It takes a feature vector as input and outputs a
vector of probabilities for each class.
Suppose the data owner wants to make the model available for
public queries. That is, he intends to allow anyone to submit a
feature vector and get predictions from the model. In this paper,
we want to estimate the membership inference risk of releasing
the model based on simple measurements and theoretical analysis.
Specifically, given a machine learning model, we want to answer
the following questions: Is there a privacy risk if the model is open to
public queries? Are certain models riskier than others? Which records
have higher privacy risks?
We consider the privacy risk in the setting of membership pri-
vacy. The privacy risk of a record is estimated by the adversary’s
ability to infer whether the record is a part of the training set. We
estimate this risk under the assumption that the machine learning
models are trained by trusted parties. That is, we expect the par-
ties training and releasing the model have the goal of protecting
the training set to the extent this is practical and will therefore
not be motivated to create a covert channel by embedding private
information into the model’s predictions. Under this assumption,
we inspect the risk of accidental privacy leakage—the risk that a
machine learning algoirthm would accidentally learn too much
information about an individual record during the training process.
To estimate privacy risk under a strong adversary, we assume
that the adversary knows all the records inD, the size of the training
set sampled from D, and the machine learning algorithm used to
train themodel.We assume the training set to be uniformly sampled
from D. Therefore, each record in D is equally likely to be included
in the training set, and the adversary does not know which records
are included. The goal of the adversary is to perform a membership
inference attack by querying the machine learning model. That is,
given a particular target record t ∈ D, he wants to infer whether t
is used to train the model he queries.
Notations. Let T be the training set of the model. Since T is ran-
domly sampled from D, we call D the candidate set for T.
We define Xm to be a set of all possible features and Y to be
the set of all possible class labels: {y1,y2, . . . ,yk }. Each record
z ∈ D can be divided into two parts: the feature vector x ∈ Xm
and the class label y ∈ Y . Let A be the classification algorithm and
c = A(T ) be the output classifier. We assume that for each query x,
c(x) returns a vector of conditional probability of all class labels y ∈
{y1,y2, . . . ,yk } given feature vector x. We usepc (y | x) to represent
the conditional probability of class labely given feature x, predicted
by classifier c . That is, c(x) = (pc (y1 | x), pc (y2 | x), . . . , pc (yk | x)) .
For classifiers that do not directly provide predicted probabilities,
these can be obtained through normalization over the class labels.
In membership inferences, the adversary wants to infer whether
a specific record t = (x(t ),y(t )) ∈ D is part of the training setT . We
call t the target record of the attack.
There are two approaches that an adversary can take to perform
a membership inference attack on a target record t . He can launch
a direct attack by querying the features of the target record x(t ). Or,
he can perform an indirect attack by querying some feature vector
x , x(t ). Intuitively, a direct attack should have better performance
than an indirect attack because querying the features of t should
give more information about t compared to querying other features.
In this paper, we first study the membership privacy risk under
this assumption. In section 6, we test this assumption by analyzing
some commonly used classifiers.
3 BACKGROUND ON MEMBERSHIP
ATTACKS
In this section, we briefly review the membership attacks proposed
in prior work [37]. In a membership attack, an adversary is given
black-box access to a target classifier A(T ) and wants to infer
whether a particular record t is included in the training set T .
The membership attack proposed by Shokri et al. [37] is a direct
attack. The adversary queries the target record t and uses the target
classifiers’ predictions on t to infer the membership status of t . The
authors transform the membership attack into a classification task.
For each record t , there are two possible classes: class label “in”
represents that the record is in the training set, and class label “out”
represents that the record is not in the training set. The features in
the membership classification task are the original attributes of t
and the target classifier’s predictions on t . The adversary trains an
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attack classifier for the membership classification task and uses it
to infer the membership of a target record.
To create training sets for the membership classification task,
the authors introduce “shadow” training techniques. Concretely,
the adversary trains multiple “shadow models” using the same
machine learning algorithm A on records sampled from the same
population as T . These shadow models are used to simulate the
behavior of the target model and generate a set of training records
with labeled membership information. Specifically, the adversary
queries each shadow model with two sets of records: the training
set of the shadow model and a disjoint test set. For each record,
a new feature vector is generated by concatenating the record’s
original attributes with the shadow classifier’s predictions on that
record. A new class label is created to reflect membership, i.e., “in”
for records in the training set, “out” for records in the test set.
Using the labeled dataset, the adversary trains a neural network
as “attack” classifier and uses it to infer the membership of a target
record t , given black-box access to a classifier A(T ).
In this paper, we reproduce this membership attack and design
two new membership attacks based on shadow training techniques.
One of the new membership attacks has much better performance
compared to the attack proposed in [37]. We use these attacks to
validate DTP’s ability to measure the membership privacy risk of a
target record t with respect to a classifier A(T ).
4 MEASURING MEMBERSHIP PRIVACY
4.1 Understanding Membership Attacks
In a membership attack on a classifier c = A(T ), an adversary
tries to infer whether a target record t = (x(t ),y(t )) is in the train-
ing set of c . The adversary can submit any query x and analyze
the returned results q = c(x). With some background knowledge
about the behavior of the classification algorithm and the candidate
dataset D, an adversary can estimate the following two conditional
probabilities: Pr [t ∈ T | c(x) = q] and Pr [t < T | c(x) = q], which
he uses to infer whether t is a member of the training set.
The accuracy of a membership attack depends on two properties.
First, it depends on the adversary’s ability in correctly estimating
Pr [t ∈ T | c(x) = q] and Pr [t < T | c(x) = q]. An adversary with a
stronger background knowledge has more accurate estimates and
thus obtains higher accuracy. Second, it depends on the properties
of the target record t , the training dataset T , and the classification
algorithm A. Intuitively, a membership attack will have higher
accuracy on overfitted classifiers because these capture statisti-
cal peculiarities of the training dataset that do not generalize to
the whole population. Also, outliers may be more vulnerable to
membership attacks.
Based on this intuition, we want to estimate the membership
attacks risk by measuring the generalizability of a classifier. Specifi-
cally, we calculate the maximum change in a classifier’s predictions
when the target record is removed from the training set.
4.2 Differential Training Privacy
We propose a measure of membership privacy risk of a target record
t with respect to classification algorithm A and training set T .
Definition 4.1 (Differential Training Privacy). A record t ∈ T is ϵ-
differentially training private (ϵ-DTP) with respect to classification
algorithm A and training set T , if for all x ∈ Xm and y ∈ Y , we
have
pA(T )(y | x) ≤ eϵpA(T \{t })(y | x)
and
pA(T )(y | x) ≥ e−ϵpA(T \{t })(y | x).
That is, the target record t is DTP with algorithmA and training
set T if the predicted conditional probability of any class label y
given any feature vector x does not change much when t is removed
fromT . By definition, a record t with low DTP only has a small influ-
ence on the output of the classifierA(T ). Since a classifier’s output
is also influenced by other factors such as random initialization
and unexpected records in the training set, from the adversary’s
perspective, the small influence by t is indistinguishable from the
influence by other uncertain factors. Therefore, records with low
DTP are less vulnerable to membership inference attacks.
Unlike differential privacy [11], DTP is a local property related to
the training set. Therefore, DTP is experimentally measurable given
a target record t , a training set T , and a classification algorithm
A. We use the following definition of DTP metric to quantify the
privacy risk of the target record t .
Definition 4.2. (DTP Metric). Given classification algorithm A,
training set T , and target record t , the differential training privacy
metric DTPA,T (t) is the least ϵ such that t is ϵ-DTP with A and T .
In practice, DTPA,T (t) is calculated as the maximum ratio be-
tween the predictions given byA(T ) andA(T \ {t}) for all x ∈ Xm
and for all y ∈ Y . That is,
DTPA,T (t) = max
x∈Xm,y∈Yϵ
(x,y)
t ,
where
ϵ
(x,y)
t = max
(
pA(T )(y | x)
pA(T \{t })(y | x)
,
pA(T \{t })(y | x)
pA(T )(y | x)
)
.
DTPA,T (t) can be naively measured by brute force over all x ∈
Xm and all y ∈ Y . However, considering the potentially large size
of Xm , this approach is neither practical nor efficient. Therefore,
we propose pointwise differential training privacy (PDTP) as a
relaxation of DTP.
Definition 4.3. (Pointwise Differential Training Privacy). A record
t ∈ T is ϵ-pointwise differentially training private (ϵ-PDTP) with
respect to classification algorithm A and training dataset T , if for
all y ∈ Y , we have
pA(T )(y | x(t )) ≤ eϵpA(T \{t })(y | x(t ))
and
pA(T )(y | x(t )) ≥ e−ϵpA(T \{t })(y | x(t )).
Similarly we propose the following definition for the metric
PDTP(A,T ):
Definition 4.4. (PDTP Metric). Given classification algorithm A,
training set T , and target record t ∈ T , the pointwise differential
training privacy metric PDTPA,T (t) is the least ϵ such that t is
ϵ-PDTP with A and T .
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PDTP is a relaxation of DTP which bounds the change of the
classifier’s response on a single query x(t ), when t is removed from
the training set. Because of this, PDTP can be efficiently calculated
given any classification algorithm A, training set T , and target
record t by training an alternative classifier A(T \ {t}). This pro-
cess is similar to the leave-one-out (LOO) cross-validation technique
used in machine learning [15]. Since LOO is a core technique for
evaluating a machine learning model, there is considerable expe-
rience with both learning algorithms for which its calculation is
easier and optimizations to improve this performance.
The measurement PDTPA,T (t) is useful for two different rea-
sons: First, PDTPA,T (t) is a lower bound of DTPA,T (t). When
DTPA,T (t) cannot be efficiently calculated, data owners can use
PDTPA,T (t) as an optimistic estimation of a classifier’s privacy
risk. If a target record t has high PDTP withA andT , releasing the
classifierA(T ) brings high privacy risks for t . Therefore, PDTP can
be used as an indicator of membership privacy risk. Second, PDTP
reflects the performance of a direct membership attack. When the
adversary uses c(x(t )) to infer the membership of t , it is sufficient to
bound the change of c(x(t ))when t is removed from the training set
of c . Since we assume direct membership attacks have better per-
formance than indirect ones, PDTPA,T (t) is a good estimation of
membership privacy risk of t . In Section 5, we demonstrate the use-
fulness of PDTP measurements by showing their correlations with
the performance of different types of direct membership attacks.
5 CASE STUDIES
DTP measures the sensitivity of a target record t on the predic-
tions of a classifier A(T ). Intuitively, the larger t ’s influence on
the predictions of A(T ) is, the more these predictions leak about
t . This, in turn, makes t more vulnerable to membership inference
attacks. However, to use DTP to calculate the membership risk, we
still need to answer the following: How do we use PDTP to estimate
the risk of membership attacks? How accurate are these estimations?
What values of PDTP indicate a potential privacy risk?
In this section, we answer these three questions through a series
of experiments on direct membership attacks.
To demonstrate PDTP’s effectiveness in measuring risks of mem-
bership attacks, we study the performance of three types of di-
rect membership attacks on different datasets and classification
algorithms. We find that, when a membership inference attack is
effective, i.e., the attack accuracy is greater than 0.7, PDTPA,T (t)
is highly correlated with the attack’s accuracy on t , and the corre-
lation is higher for attacks with higher accuracy.
To identify high-risk records, we use the DTP-1 hypothesis: if a
classifier has a DTP value above 1, it should not be published. Since
PDTP is a lower bound for DTP, we use PDTP measurements to
identify records that do not satisfy DTP-1 criterion and demonstrate
effective membership attacks on these records.
5.1 Datasets
We first introduce datasets used in the experiments.
UCI Adult Dataset (Adult). The dataset [19] contains 48,842
records extracted from the 1994 Census Database. Each record has
14 attributes with demographic information such as age, gender, and
education. The class attribute is the income class of the individual:
> 50K or <= 50K. The classification task is to predict an individual’s
income class based on his demographic information. We use all
the features except the final weight (fnlwgt) attribute, which is
a weight on the Current Population Survey (CPS) file used for
accurate populations estimates. We randomly sample 2,000 records
as candidate set D, and 1,000 records out of D as training set.
Purchase Dataset (Purchase). Similar to the purchase dataset
in [37], we construct a dataset containing user’s purchase history
based on Kaggle’s “acquire valued shoppers” challenge. The orig-
inal contains the user’s transaction histories, including product
category, product brand, purchase quantity, purchase amount, etc.
We pre-process the dataset by constructing one record for each cus-
tomer. We use the product category attribute in the original dataset
to create 836 binary feature attributes. Each feature attribute is
a product category (e.g., sparkling water), and the value of the
attribute is true if and only if the corresponding customer has pur-
chased this product in the past year. We cluster the dataset into 10
clusters using k-means based on Weka’s implementation [5]. Each
cluster represents a type of consumer buying behavior. We use the
cluster index of each record as its class label. The classification task
is to predict a consumer’s buying behavior based on products he
has purchased. We randomly sample 2,000 records as candidate set
D, and 1,000 records out of D as training set.
5.2 Machine Learning Models
We study the performance of membership attack and PDTP mea-
surements on three different machine learning models.
Neural Networks (NN). We build a fully connected neural network
with one hidden layer of 64 units and a LogSoftMax layer. We
use Tanh as the activation function and negative log-likelihood
criterion as the classification criterion. We use a learning rate of
0.01 for both datasets. The maximum epoch of training is set to
100 for the adult dataset and 30 for the purchase dataset. When
preprocessing the adult dataset, we convert categorical attributes
into binary attributes and normalize all the numerical attributes.
Naive Bayes Classifiers (NB). We build a Naive Bayes classi-
fier [32] to predict the class label based on Bayes Theorem un-
der the assumption of conditional independence. We use Laplace
smoothing [9] to smooth the categorical attributes in the dataset.
Logistic Regressions (LR). We build a logistic regression model
using Weka’s implementation of Logistic model trees [20].
Binning the Predictions. We limit the precision of the model out-
puts using data binning technique with a bin size of 0.01. Since the
outputs of the classifiers are probabilities in the range of [0, 1], we
divide this range into 100 bins of the same size. Instead of returning
the original output of a classifier, we make the model return the
center of the bin to which the original output belongs. For example,
if a classifier predicts a class label to have 0 probability given a
feature vector, the output of the classifier would be 0.005, which is
the center of the first bin. This binning technique prevents models
from leaking private information that does not significantly con-
tribute to their accuracy. It also prevents PDTP measurements from
getting unreasonably large due to close-to-zero denominators.
4
5.3 Attacks
Given a target classifier c = A(T ) and a target record t , a member-
ship attack distinguishes between the following hypotheses:
H0 : t < T and H1 : t ∈ T .
In all of the following attacks, we assume that the adversary
gets the target classifier’s prediction on the target record c(x(t )) =(
pc (y1 | x(t )), pc (y2 | x(t )), . . . , pc (yk | x(t ))
)
, and tries to launch a
membership attack on t using this information. We also assume
the adversary is powerful enough to know the size of training set
T and has access to the candidate dataset D and the classification
algorithm A based on Kerckhoffs’s principle.
Let qi = pc (yi | x(t )) (1 ≤ i ≤ k). Here, qi represents the class
probability for class label yi predicted by the target classifier given
the features of the target record. Therefore, the vector q = c(x(t )) =
(q1,q2, . . . ,qk ) can be viewed as a probability distribution over all
the possible class labels.
Untargeted Attacks. We reproduce the membership attack of [37]
on a neural network model learned on the purchase dataset. This
attack converts the membership inference problem into a classifica-
tion task with two class labels: class label “in” represents hypothesis
H1 (t ∈ T ), and class label “out” represents hypothesis H0 (t < T ).
Concretely, the attack consists of two steps:
Step 1: Training Shadow Classiffiers. The adversary trains shadow
classifiers to simulate the behavior of the target classifier A(T ).
First, he samples M shadow datasets T1,T2, . . . ,TM of the same
size as the target dataset T . Then, he trains M shadow classifiers
A(T1),A(T2), . . . ,A(TM ) using the same classification algorithm
as the target classifier A(T ). In experiments, we takeM = 20.
Step 2: Building the Attack Classifier. The adversary uses the shadow
classifiers to label each record in the candidate dataset D according
to Algorithm 1. The algorithm takes the shadow classifiers and
the candidate dataset as input and outputs a dataset Dattack, which
serves as the training set for the attack classifier.
In experiments, the attack classifier is a fully connected neural
network with one hidden layer of 32 units and a LogSoftMax layer.
We use ReLU as activation function and negative log-likelihood
criterion as classification criterion. We set the learning rate to 0.01
and the maximum epochs of training to 30 iterations.
Step 3: Launching the Attack. Given a target record t , the adversary
constructs a new feacture vector by concatenating the original fea-
ture vector x(t ), the original class label y(t ), and the target model’s
prediction on the target record c(x(t )). That is,
f (t )attack =
(
x(t ),y(t ), c(x(t ))
)
.
The adversary queries the attack classifier with the new feature
vector and gets a prediction consisting of two probabilities: pin
is the probability of class label “in”, and pout is the probability of
class label “out”. The advesary accepts hypothesis H1 if, and only
if, pin > pout.
We call this type of attack an untargeted attack because the attack
classifier obtained from step 2 can be used to attack all the records
in the candidate dataset. Therefore, when the adversary tries to
attack multiple records, he only needs to run step 1 and step 2 once.
Step 3 of the attack, which needs to be repeated on each targeted
Algorithm 1: Step 2 of Untargeted Attack
Input: A set of shadow classifiers
{A(T1),A(T2), . . . ,A(TM )}, candidate set D
Output: Training set of the attack classifier Dattack
1 Dattack ← ∅
2 for j = 1, 2, . . . ,M do
3 for r ∈ D do
4 q(r ) ←
(
pA(Tj )(y1 | x(r )), . . . , pA(Tj )(yk | x(r ))
)
5 f (r ) ←
(
x(r ),y(r ), q(r )
)
6 if r ∈ Tj then
7 Dattack ← Dattack
⋃ {(
f (r ), in
)}
8 end
9 else
10 Dattack ← Dattack
⋃ {(
f (r ), out
)}
11 end
12 end
13 end
14 return Dattack
record, has much lower computational overhead. Although this
attack is more efficient when the adversary wants to find out any
vulnerable records, it has lower accuracy compared to some of the
targeted attacks.
Distance-Based Targeted Attacks. When the adversary has a
specific target record in mind, he can design attacks tuned to per-
form well only on the target record. We call this type of attacks
targeted attacks. In a distance-based targeted attack, an adversary
uses shadow models to estimate the average predictions of classi-
fiers satisfying hypothesis H0, and those of classifiers satisfying
hypothesis H1. Then he calculates the distance between c(x) and
the two average predictions and accept the hypothesis under which
the average predictions are closer to c(x). Concretely:
Step 1: Training Shadow Classifiers. Let n = |T |. The adversary
uniformly samples M datasets T ′1 ,T
′
2 , . . . ,T
′
M of size n − 1 from
D \ {t}, and takes Tj = T ′j
⋃{t} for all 1 ≤ j ≤ M . The adversary
trains a pair of shadow classifiers A(Tj ),A(T ′j ) for all 1 ≤ j ≤ M ,
and gets their predictions on the target record:
pinj =
(
pA(Tj )(y1 | x), pA(Tj )(y2 | x), . . . , pA(Tj )(yk | x)
)
,
and
poutj =
(
pA(T ′j )(y1 | x), pA(T ′j )(y2 | x), . . . , pA(T ′j )(yk | x)
)
.
Take pin = 1M
∑M
j=1 p
in
j and pout =
1
M
∑M
j=1 p
out
j . Like the query
result q, pin and pout can be viewed as two probability distributions
over all the possible class labels.
Step 2: Comparing KL-Divergence. The KL-Divergence [29] between
two distributions P and Q is defined to be
DKL(P ∥ Q) =
∑
i
pi log
pi
qi
.
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Table 1: Performance of Three Membership Attacks on NN-Purchase.
Membership Attack Attack Accuracy Attack Precision Attack Recall Attack F1 Score Correlation with PDTP p-Value
Untargeted Attack 0.6680 0.6386 0.8500 0.7294 0.4864 2.89 × 10−7
Frequency-Based Attack 0.6257 0.5933 0.8253 0.7174 0.5052 8.29 × 10−8
Distance-Based Attack 0.8533 0.8470 0.9087 0.8768 0.7653 1.85 × 10−20
(a) Untargetted Membership Attack on
NN-Purchase.
(b) Frequency-Based Membership Attack
on NN-Purchase.
(c) Distance-Based Membership Attack on
NN-Purchase.
Figure 1: Membership Attacks on NN-Purchase.
The adversary infers the membership of t by comparing q’s KL-
Divergence to pin and pout, and accepts hypothesis H1 if, and only
if, DKL(q ∥ pout) > DKL(q ∥ pin).
In the experiment, we takeM = 5. That is, for each target record
t , we sample 5 datasets and train 10 shadow classifiers. 5 of the
shadow classifiers are trained with t in the training set, and the
other 5 are trained without t in the training set.
Frequency-Based Targeted Attacks. In a frequency-based tar-
geted attack, the adversary trains the same shadow models as in
the distance-based membership attack. However, instead of cal-
culating the average of the predictions, the adversary counts the
frequency that the predictions of classifiers satisfying hypothesis
H0 fall into the same bins as c(x) as well as the frequency that the
predictions of classifiers satisfying hypothesis H1 fall into the same
bins as c(x). The adversary accepts the hypothesis under which
predictions more often fall into the same bin as c(x).
The first step of a frequency-based targeted attack is the same as
the distance-based targeted attack. The adversary trains 2m shadow
classifiers,m of which with t in training set. In the second step, for
1 ≤ i ≤ k , the adversary calculates oini as the number of shadow
models that are trained with t in training set and gives the same
predicted probability on class labelyi as the target dataset. Similarly,
oouti is calculated as the number of shadow models that are trained
without t in the training set and gives the same predicted probability
on class label yi as the target dataset.
Finally the adversary estimates the following ratio:
Pr [t ∈ T | c(x) = q]
Pr [t < T | c(x) = q] =
k∏
i=1
oini
oouti
.
The adversary accepts hypothesis H1 iff Pr[t ∈T |c(x)=q]Pr[t<T |c(x)=q] > 1.
Like for the distance-based membership attack, we takeM = 5 in
the experiment and train 10 shadow models for each target record.
5.4 Evaluation Metrics
Multiple Iterations of Attacks. To evaluate their performance,
we run 100 iterations of each membership attack. In each iteration,
we partition the candidate set into two equal-sized parts: D1 and
D2. First, we use D1 as training set and D2 as test set. A target clas-
sifier A(D1) is trained on the training set and available for public
queries. We randomly select 100 records out of D as the adversary’s
target records. For each target record t , we run a targeted attack
with A(D1) as target classifier. In each membership attack, the
goal of the adversary is to predict whether t ∈ D1 by querying
A(D1). Then, we switch the role of D1 and D2, and use D2 as the
training set and D1 as test set. We then repeat the membership
attack with A(D2) as target classifier. This process ensures that
the target record occurs once in the training set and once in the
test set in each iteration so that the baseline accuracy is always 0.5.
Since we can only calculate PDTP of a record t when t is in the
training set, we measure the PDTP of t as PDTPA,D1 (t) if t ∈ D1
and as PDTPA,D2 (t) if t ∈ D2. Hence, in each iteration, we launch
two membership attacks and get one PDTP measurement for each
record inD based on definition 4.3. We repeat this process for 100 it-
erations. Ideally, one should calculate a record’s average PDTP over
100 PDTP measurements. However, PDTP measurements over mul-
tiple datasets contain redundant information. As shown in figure 3,
average PDTP taken over 10 measurements has approximately the
same correlation with performance of membership inference at-
tacks as average PDTP taken over 100 measurements. Therefore,
to save time, we only take PDTP measurements in the first 10 iter-
ations. For each target record, we use the average of its 10 PDTP
measurements to estimate its overall membership risk.
Per-Target Attack Accuracy. We want to analyze the privacy
risk of each record in D separately. That is, instead of looking
at the membership attack accuracy on each training set, we are
interested in the overall attack accuracy on a single record over the
200 membership attacks. Therefore, we propose per-target attack
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Figure 2: Maximum Per-Target Accuracy of Three Membership
Attacks on NN-Purchase.
accuracy on a record t as the adversary’s proportion of correct
membership inference on t over all the attacks performed on t . For
example, in the experiment, we launch 200 membership attacks
on each record in D. Therefore, the per-target attack accuracy of
a record is the number of correct membership inferences on that
record divided by 200.
5.5 Results
Comparison of Different Attacks. First, we compare the perfor-
mance of three membership attacks on neural networks trained
on the purchase dataset. We train 200 neural network models over
different training sets sampled from the same candidate set and
use them as the target classifiers for membership attacks. All the
target classifiers are overfitted to their training sets. The average
training accuracy of all the target classifiers is 1, and the average
test accuracy of all the target classifiers is 0.6434.
Figures 1a, 1b, and 1c show the per-target accuracy and average
PDTP of each target record under three types membership attacks.
Each point represents one target record in the candidate set. The
horizontal axis is the average PDTP measurement of that target
over 10 iterations of PDTP measurements. The vertical axis is the
per-target accuracy of that target over 200 repetitions of member-
ship attacks. A point’s position on the horizontal axis shows its
membership privacy risk estimated by PDTP. According to PDTP
measurements, points on the right part of the figures have higher
membership privacy risks compared to points on the left part of
the figures. A point’s position on the vertical axis shows its actual
membership privacy risk under a given membership attack. Points
on the top part of the figures are more vulnerable to the attack
because the attack has higher accuracy on these records.
For each attack, we calculate the Pearson correlation coefficient
between average PDTP and the per-target attack accuracy. We also
calculate the p-value for testing the hypothesis of no correlation
against the alternative hypothesis that there is a correlation be-
tween average PDTP and per-target attack accuracy. Table 1 shows
the performance of eachmembership attack and their correlation co-
efficients with average PDTP. The performance of all three attacks
has statistically significant correlations with the average PDTP.
Figure 1 shows the accuracy of three types of membership attacks
and their correlations with PDTP (ρ). We observe that attacks with
higher accuracy also have higher correlation PDTP measurements.
This correlation demonstrates PDTP’s ability to identify potential
membership privacy risks effectively.
Figure 3: Correlation between Average PDTP and Membership
Attack Accuracy.
Overall, distance-based targeted attacks have the highest ac-
curacy. They outperform the untargeted attacks in the previous
work [37] by approximately 19%. However, some records are more
vulnerable to some types of membership attacks. For example, one
record in the purchase dataset is immune to distance-based mem-
bership attacks which only achieve baseline accuracy, whereas the
untargeted attack achieves accuracy of 0.94. This example demon-
strates the insufficiency of estimating privacy risks based on one
type of attack. Even a strong attack may fail to identify some of the
vulnerabilities that can be used by other attacks. Figure 2 shows the
maximum per-target accuracy among three membership attacks.
The Pearson correlation coefficient between the maximum accuracy
and PDTP measurements is 0.8936. This is very strong correlation.
Among all records with PDTP greater than 1, 84.62% of them have
maximum per-target accuracy higher than 0.8, and all of them have
maximum per-target accuracy higher than 0.6. This result supports
the DTP-1 hypothesis that classifiers with DTP above 1 should not
be published.
Privacy Risks of Different Models and Datasets. To compare
the privacy risks of different datasets and classifiers, we use PDTP
measurements on NN, NB, and LR classifiers learned on the adult
and purchase datasets. We use distance-based membership attack
because it has higher overall accuracy. Table 2 shows the perfor-
mance of each target model, the per-target accuracy of membership
attacks, and its correlation with PDTP measurements.
The results of membership attacks on NB and LR models trained
on the purchase dataset are shown in Figure 4b and Figure 4c. Both
of the two classifiers have records with PDTP higher than 1, and
most of these records are vulnerable to distance-based membership
attacks. The accuracy of the attacks is highly correlated with PDTP
measurements.
The results of membership attacks on NN, NB, and LR models
trained on the adult dataset are shown in Figure 5a, Figure 5b,
and Figure 5c. Unlike the purchase dataset, the adult dataset has
fewer classes and features which help improve the generalizability
of models learned on this dataset. The training and test accuracy
reflects good generalizability of all three models learned on the
adult dataset. The distance-based membership attacks also have
worse performance on the adult dataset, indicating better mem-
bership privacy. However, even if the average PDTP measurement
is relatively low for all three models, the PDTP for some records
is greater than 1 with the neural network model learned on the
adult dataset indicating high membership privacy risk. This risk
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Table 2: Performance of Distance-Based attack on Different Target Models.
Target Training Test Attack Attack Attack Attack Average Correlation p-Value
Model Accuracy Accuracy Accuracy Precision Recall F1 Score PDTP with PDTP for Correlation
NN-Purchase 1.0000 0.6434 0.8533 0.8470 0.9087 0.8768 3.4019 0.7653 1.85 × 10−20
NB-Purchase 0.8641 0.7204 0.5958 0.6945 0.4038 0.5107 0.9027 0.9239 1.16 × 10−42
LR-Purchase 1.0000 0.6241 0.7888 0.7314 0.9187 0.8144 2.8917 0.8138 7.78 × 10−25
NN-Adult 0.8555 0.8566 0.5340 0.5311 0.4402 0.4356 0.5847 0.4588 1.57 × 10−6
NB-Adult 0.8453 0.8410 0.5128 0.5876 0.1027 0.1748 0.0299 0.5166 3.76 × 10−8
LR-Adult 0.8711 0.8536 0.5134 0.5130 0.3818 0.4378 0.1460 -0.0008 0.9343
(a) Comparison between Three
Membership Attacks on NN-Purchase10
(b) Distance-Based Membership Attack on
NB-Purchase
(c) Distance-Based Membership Attack on
LR-Purchase
Figure 4: Membership Attacks on classifiers learned on purchase dataset
is also reflected by the high per-target accuracy of distance-based
membership attack on some of the records with high PDTP. There-
fore, good generalizability is not always sufficient for protecting
membership privacy. It is possible that a model is not overfitted
on the training set, but still captures some private information of
some records in the training set. However, this privacy risk can be
discovered by measuring PDTP for each record in the training set.
For NB and LR models trained on the adult dataset, we did not
find any records with PDTP greater than 1, and the per-target
attack accuracy of the distance-based attack is smaller than 70% for
all target records. This result shows that state-of-art membership
inference attacks do not work well on these models, and the PDTP
measurements do not indicate high privacy risk for any of the
records. The correlations between PDTP measurements and per-
target attack accuracy is lower compared to attacks with better
performance.
Multiple PDTP Measurements. In the previous experiments, for
each target t , we use the average of 10 PDTP measurements on t
to estimate the PDTP of t over all the target classifiers. To study
how the number of PDTP measurements influence our estimation
of the membership privacy risk of t , we take the Naive Bayes clas-
sifier trained on the purchase dataset as the target model perform
a distance-based membership attack. We gradually increase the
number of PDTP measurements from 1 to 100 and calculate the av-
erage PDTP’s correlation with the accuracy of membership attacks.
Figure 3 shows that the correlation between average PDTP and ac-
curacy of membership attacks increases as we increase the number
of PDTP measurements. The correlation coefficient stabilizes after
around 10 measurements.
6 PROTECTIONS AGAINST INDIRECT
MEMBERSHIP ATTACKS
In this section, we investigate the risk of indirect membership
attacks where the adversary queries the classifier for features other
than the target record.
6.1 Risk
In the previous experiments, we assume that the best way of doing
a membership attack is to launch a direct attack by querying the
target record. However, is it possible that, for some classifier c , there
exists a query x , x(t ) so that c(x) leaks more private information
than c(x(t ))? That is, can an indirect membership attack outperform
any direct membership attacks? Although it is hard to design a good
indirect membership attack for classifiers discussed in Section 5,
this risk of indirect membership attacks can be demonstrated with a
carefully designed classifier that encodes membership information
of one specific record.
Let c = A(T ) be a classifier learned on a training set T with
machine learning algorithmA. Instead of releasing c , we construct
a classifier c∗ as follows:
c∗(x) =

c(x) if x , 0
1 if x = 0 and t ∈ T
0 if x = 0 and t < T .
Assume x(t ) , 0, apparently, an indirect membership attack with
query x = 0 givesmore information about the target t compared to a
direct membership attack with query x(t ). This example shows that
for some classifiers, indirect attacks can outperform direct attacks
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(a) Distance-Based Membership Attack on
NN-Adult.
(b) Distance-Based Membership Attack on
NB-Adult
(c) Distance-Based Membership Attack on
LR-Adult.
Figure 5: Membership Attacks on classifiers learned on adult dataset.
for some records. Therefore, a record can have high membership
privacy risk even if its PDTP measurement is low.
Clearly, c∗ is not representative of a real-life machine learning
model, especially when the model is trained by the data owner who
wants to protect against privacy leakage. However, to achieve a
stronger privacy guarantee, we need to study the potential risk of
indirect membership attacks and prevent models from leaking “side
channel” information about records in their training sets.
6.2 Training Stability
To protect against indirect membership attacks, we need a way
of calculating DTPA,T (t) without the need of brute forcing the
whole feature space Xm . Since we can already efficiently calculate
PDTPA,T (t), a natural approach is to bound DTPA,T (t) based on
PDTPA,T (t). We call this property training stability.
Definition 6.1. (Training Stability) A classification algorithm A
is δ -training stable on dataset T if there exists a constant δ > 1, so
that for all t ∈ T with pA(T \{t })(y(t ) | x(t )) > 0 and pA(T )(y(t ) |
x(t )) > 0, for all x ∈ Xm , for all y ∈ Y , let
γt = max(δ ,
pA(T )(y(t ) | x(t ))
pA(T \{t })(y(t ) | x(t ))
,
pA(T \{t })(y(t ) | x(t ))
pA(T )(y(t ) | x(t ))
),
we have
pA(T )(y | x) ≤ γtpA(D\{t })(y | x),
and
pA(T )(y | x) ≥ γ−1t pA(D\{t })(y | x).
Given an algorithm that is δ -training stable onT , for all t ∈ T , the
ratio between the predictions of two classifiersA(T ) andA(T \{t})
is bounded either by the ratio between their predictions on the
query (x(t ),y(t )) or by a parameter δ .
If an algorithm A is δ -training stable on T , DTPA,T (t) can be
calculated by measuring PDTPA,T (t), which is much more efficient.
Theorem 6.2. If a record t ∈ T is ϵ-PDTP with classification
algorithmA and datasetT , andA is δ -training stable onT , we have
t is ϵ ′-DTP with A and T , where ϵ ′ = max(ϵ, lnδ ).
Proof. See Appendix A. □
On the one hand, δ -training stability is a desirable property from
a privacy perspective because it reduces the computational cost
of estimating the influence of an individual record on the learned
classifier. On the other hand, δ -training stability is also a metaphor
of learning in real life. For example, If a professor explains an
example question in class, he expects the students to do well on
similar questions in the exam. If the exam contains a question that is
the same as the example question explained in class, most students
are expected to answer it correctly. Similarly, suppose we have a
classifierA(T \ {t}) and an additional record t . By adding t into the
training dataset, we expect the classifier to have better performance
on t or records similar to t . This can be viewed as a metaphor of
learning in real life.
6.3 Training Stability of Classifiers
With the aforementioned intuitions in mind, we study the training
stability of some commonly used classifiers. However, due to the
complexity and variability of different machine learning algorithms,
we cannot cover all well-known classifiers in this section. Table 3
shows the training stability of some commonly used classifiers.
Bayes Inference Classifiers. For a Bayes inference classifierA(T ),
the prediction pA(T )(y | x) is given by the conditional probability
of class label y given feature vector x in the training dataset T .
Proposition 6.3. Bayes inference algorithm is δ -training stable
for δ = 43 on any training dataset.
Proof. See Appendix A. □
Naive Bayes Classifiers. Naive Bayes classifiers make predictions
using Bayes theorem and assume conditional independence [32].
Proposition 6.4. Let T be a training dataset with m features
and n examples. Let ymin be the least supported class label in T . Let
nymin be the number of examples with class label ymin. Naive Bayes
algorithm is δ -training stable for
δ =
(
nymin
nymin − 1
)m−1 n
n − 1 .
Proof. See Appendix A. □
If T is a large training dataset, there would be a large number
of training examples with class label ymin. Therefore, δ would be
close to 1 for a large dataset T , and the maximum ratio between
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predictions of A(T ) and A(T \ {t}) is determined by the ratio
between their predictions on the query (x(t ),y(t )).
Naive Bayes classification is often used with Laplace smooth-
ing [35]. When conditional probabilities are estimated from the
training dataset, a small constant is added to both the numerator
and denominator to get a "smoothed" version of the prediction. The
constant is determined by the number of possible values for each
attribute. Suppose each attribute in x has at most v possible values.
When calculating the conditional probability of an attribute given
the class label, the numerator is increased by 1, and the denominator
is increased by v . Therefore, naive Bayes classification algorithm
with Laplace smoothing is δ -training stable with a slightly different
δ compared to the original naive Bayes classification.
Proposition 6.5. Let T be a training dataset withm features and
n examples. Suppose each element in the feature vector has at most v
possible values. Let ymin be the least supported class label in T . Let
nymin be the number of examples with class label ymin. Naive Bayes
with Laplace smoothing is δ -training stable on T for
δ =
(
nymin +v
nymin
)m−1 n
n − 1 .
Linear Statistical Queries Classifiers. Linear statistical queries
(LSQ) classifiers are proposed as a generalization framework for
naive Bayes, Bayesian network, and Markov models [33].
Let χ : Xm → {0, 1} be a feature function that maps a feature
vector into a binary value. This representation is useful for features
depending on more than one element in x (for example, χ (x) = 1 iff
x1 = 1 and x2 = 1). A statistical query PˆT[χ,y] gives the probability
of all the examples with feature χ (x) = 1 and class label y in the
training dataset.
A linear statistical queries (LSQ) classifier is a linear discrimina-
tor over the feature space, with coefficients calculated by statistical
queries. For the convenience of discussion, we review the following
definition of LSQ classifier for binary classification:
Definition 6.6 (Linear Statistical Queries classifier [33]). Let X be
a class of features. Let f[χ,y] be a function that depends only on the
values PˆT[χ,y] for χ ∈ X. A linear statistical queries (LSQ) hypothesis
predicts y ∈ {0, 1} given x ∈ Xm when
y = argmax
y∈{0,1}
∑
χ ∈X
f[χ,y](PˆT[χ,y])χ (x).
We define a family of log coefficient functions Flog that contains
all the functions f[χ,y] that calculate the log of a probability or
conditional probability in the training dataset. For example, suppose
A is a naive Bayes classification algorithmwithm feature attributes.
A can be written as an LSQ classification algorithmwithm features:
χ0 ≡ 1, and χj = x j for 1 ≤ j ≤ m, where
f[χ0,y](PˆT[χ0,y]) = log Pˆ
T
[1,y],
and for 1 ≤ j ≤ m,
f[χj ,y](PˆT[χj ,y]) = log
PˆT[xj ,y]/PˆT[1,y] .
f[χ0,y] is a log function of the prior probability of y, and f[χj ,y] is a
log function of the conditional probability of x j given y. Therefore,
the coefficient functions for naive Bayes belong to the family of log
coefficient functions. Similarly, log coefficient functions are also
used in Bayes network and Markov model.
When f[χ,y] ∈ Flog, the sum of f[χ,y] is equivalent to the prod-
uct of the corresponding probabilities. Therefore, in addition to
returning the most likely label, an LSQ classifier A(T ) is also a
probabilistic classifier that returns the following predicted proba-
bility:
pA(T )(y | x) = e
∑
χ ∈X
f[χ ,y]({PˆT[χ ,y] })χ (x)
=
∏
χ ∈X
e
f[χ ,y]({PˆT[χ ,y] })χ (x).
(1)
Each term ef[χ ,l ]({Pˆ
T
[χ ,l ] })χ (x) in Equation (1) is equivalent to cal-
culating a probability or a conditional probability in the training
dataset T using Bayes inference, therefore is 43 -training stable ac-
cording to proposition 6.3. Consequently, we have the following
proposition for LSQ probabilistic classification algorithms:
Proposition 6.7. If A is an LSQ probabilistic classification algo-
rithm with f[χ,y] ∈ Flog for all χ ∈ X,y ∈ Y , A is δ -training stable
on any training dataset with δ = ( 43 ) |X | .
For naive Bayes classification algorithm, since each attribute is
an independent feature, withM − 1 feature attributes, |X| equals
M . Compared to proposition 6.4, proposition 6.7 provides a looser
but more generalized bound on δ -training stability for naive Bayes
classification algorithm. This bound does not depend on the records
in the training datasetT . For Bayesian network and Markov models,
|X| equals to the layer of dependencies in the network. |X| gets
larger when the network structure gets more complicated.
Decision Trees. Some decision trees, such as ID3 and C4.5, con-
struct the structure of the tree by calculating information gain
of each potential partition of attributes[31]. This approach makes
achieving δ -training stability difficult because when an example is
removed from the training dataset, it is hard to predict its influence
on the structure of the tree. For example, removing one example
may change the splitting point with the highest information gain, so
that the structure of A(T ) and A(T \ {t}) are completely different.
However, when the structure of a decision tree is independent
of its training dataset, its prediction is equivalent to the conditional
probability of y given a subset of attributes determined by the
leaves of the tree. Therefore, a single decision tree with structure
independent of its training dataset is 43 -training stable.
A random decision tree classifier is a classifier constructed by
aggregating K randomly generated decision trees with structures
independent of the training dataset[12]. Random decision trees
have better privacy properties because the structure of the trees
do not leak private information about the training set. Previous
work has shown that a large amount of noise is needed to make ID3
differentially private while it is more practical to achieve differential
privacy for a random decision tree [18].
If the predictions of the random decision tree classifier is aggre-
gated in a way that preserves the training stability, the random
decision tree classifier is also training stable.
Proposition 6.8. LetAK be a random decision tree classification
algorithm with K randomly generated decision trees. Given a query
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Table 3: Training Stability of Different Classifiers.
Training Stable Classifiers Training Stability Unknown Non-Training Stable Classifiers
Bayes Inference Classifiers, Naive Bayes Classifiers, Support Vector Machines k-Nearest Neighbors
Linear Statistical Queries Neural Networks
(e.g., Bayes Networks, Markov Models) Logistic Regressions
Random Decision Trees ...
(x,y), let p1(y | x), p2(y | x), . . . , pK (y | x) be the predictions given
by each random decision tree.AK is
(
4
3
)
-training stable, if it computes
the prediction as follows:
pA(T )(y | x) = e
1
K
∑K
j=1 log(pj (y |x)).
Proof. See appendix A. □
k-Nearest Neighbors. k-nearest neighbors (k-NN) classification[4]
is an instance-based learning algorithm. Instead of constructing
a model from the training dataset, all examples in the training
dataset are saved and all computations are deferred until classifi-
cation. When responding to a query (x,y), predictions are made
by approximating locally from a few examples close to the query.
Unlike the aforementioned classifiers, k-NN is not training stable
for any δ .
For simplification, suppose A is a 1-nearest neighbor classifi-
cation algorithm. Let (x(t ),y(t )), (x1,y1) and (x2,y2) be three ex-
amples in a training dataset. (x1,y1) is the nearest neighbor of
(x(t ),y(t )) when t itself is not in the training dataset. Let (x′,y′) be
a point whose nearest neighbor in the training dataset is (x(t ),y(t ))
and second nearest neighbor is (x2,y2). Suppose y(t ) = y1 = y′ ,
y2. When t ∈ T , the classifierA(T )will predict the class label asy(t )
for both features x(t ) and x′. When t is removed from the training
dataset, the classifier A(T \ {t}) will still predict the class label as
y(t ) for feature x(t ) because of point (x1,y1). However, A(T \ {t})
will predict the class label for x′ as y2 since it is closest to (x2,y2)
when (x(t ),y(t )) is removed. Consequently, when t is removed from
the training dataset, the prediction for t remains unchanged, but
the prediction for a neighboring point (x′,y′) is greatly influenced.
If we calculate the probability given by the classifier, we have
pA(T )(y′ | x′) = 1 and pA(T \{t })(y′ | x′) = 0,
while
pA(T )(y(t ) | x(t ))
pA(T \{t })(y(t ) | x(t ))
= 1.
As k increases, the probability of the aforementioned case drops.
However, there is always a possibility that, when an exampled t
is removed from the training dataset T , for some queries (x,y),
the prediction pA(T )(y | x) drops from 1 to 0, while the predic-
tion pA(T )(y(t ) | x(t )) remains unchanged. Therefore, k-nearest
neighbors classification algorithm is not training stable.s
6.4 An Upper Bound on DTP
For non-training stable classifiers or classifiers with unknown train-
ing stability, the DTP metric cannot be directly calculated based
on PDTP measurements. However, it is still possible to estimate an
upper bound for DTP based on Lipschitz conditions.
Given a classification algorithm A, the set of possible classifiers
learned byA can be abstracted as a class of functions {Cu ,u ∈ U},
where u ∈ U is a d-dimensional vector that specifies the trainable
parameters in the classifier andU ⊆ Rd . Without loss of general-
ity, we assume that Cu maps a feature vector x to a vector of pre-
dicted log probabilities of each class labels y ∈ Y . That is, Cu (x) =(
logpA(T )(y1 | x), logpA(T )(y2 | x), . . . , logpA(T )(yk | x)
)
.
We assume that for all x ∈ Xm , Cu (x) is L-Lipschitz bounded
under infinity norm with respect to u. That is, |Cu (x) −Cu′(x)|∞ ≤
L |u − u ′ |∞. Based on Lipschitz condition, to calculate DTP(A,T ),
it is enough to measure the change of model parameters when one
training example is removed.
Let uT be the model parameters learned on datasetT and uT \{t }
be the parameters learned on T \ {t}. The following theorem gives
an upper bound of DTP(A,T ):
Theorem 6.9. If A(T ) is an L-Lipschitz bounded classifier, then
DTPA,T (t) is upper bounded by L ·maxt ∈T
uT − uT \{t } ∞.
Proof. See Appendix A. □
7 RELATEDWORK
Works on re-identification attacks [25, 30, 40] have demonstrated
the privacy risks of releasing anonymized datasets. Releasing highly-
reidentifiable datasets allows an attacker to infer sensitive attributes
of individuals in these datasets. In these studies, the researchers col-
lect background knowledge containing nonsensitive attributes from
external sources, and use them to re-identify records with sensitive
attributes in the anonymized datasets. In DTP, we make similar
assumptions on the background knowledge, but instead of publish-
ing the anonymized dataset, we assume that only the classification
model learned on the dataset is published. We demonstrate that pub-
lishing a classification model learned from a highly-reidentifiable
dataset can also bring high privacy risks.
To protect against re-identification, syntactic privacymetrics like
k-anonymity [39], l-diversity [28], and t-closeness [22] purports to
measure the privacy risk of an anonymized dataset. These metrics
reflect properties of a dataset, whereas DTP reflects the property of
the combination of a classification algorithm and a dataset.
Differential privacy (DP) [11] guarantees privacy protection
against an attacker with precise knowledge about the input dataset
and all the entities in the universe except for the target individual.
Follow-up works on DP try to relax the background knowledge by
building more realistic background knowledge models [6, 21, 23,
27, 41]. Most of these relaxations can be unified under the frame-
work of membership privacy [24], which shows that protecting
private information is equivalent to preventing an attacker from
knowing whether an individual is included in the input dataset.
Specifically, DP is shown to be equivalent to membership privacy
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with mutually independent distributions. Other extensions on DP
enhances protections on outliers in a data set while relaxes pro-
tections on the remaining examples [16, 26]. Similar to DP, these
privacy definitions cannot be directly calculated given a data set
and an algorithm. DTP is different with them in terms that it can
also be used as a privacy metric.
DP has been widely applied to complete privacy preserving ma-
chine learning tasks with different machine learning algorithms
such as regression [44], SVM [34], principal component analysis [8],
empirical risk minimization [7], and deep learning [36]. These
privacy-preserving machine learning algorithms achieve DP by
adding noises to either the objective function or the output param-
eters. A non-randomized machine learning algorithm cannot be
ϵ-DP or ϵ-PMP for any ϵ . DTP gives a possible way to measure the
privacy risk of these non-randomized machine learning algorithms.
Attacks on machine learning models have shown the possibil-
ity of inferring sensitive information about a model’s training set
with black-box access to the model. For example, model inversion
attacks [14] and naive attacks [10] infer sensitive attributes of a
record based on the model’s predictions on that record; member-
ship inference attacks [37] infer whether a record is included in
the training set of the model. Moreover, if the adversary colludes
with the party that provides the training algorithm, he can embed
sensitive information, including membership information, in the
predictions of the models [38]. All these attacks can be summarized
under the framework in [43]. DTP extends this line of work by
studying the unintentional leakage of membership information. We
emprically estimate the risk of membership inference attacks under
the assumption that the adversary only has black-box access to the
model and does not control the training algorithm.
The connections between DP and overfitting is first pointed by
the paper on the reusable hold out method [11]. The paper applies
DP on the validation dataset to make it possible for the validation
dataset to be reused, without the risk of overfitting. This demon-
strates the possibility of using privacy preserving techniques to
prevent overfitting. DTP makes this connection from the opposite
direction: using cross validation techniques in overfitting preven-
tion to measure the privacy risks.
8 REDUCING DTP
According to the DTP-1 hypothesis, it is unsafe to release a classifier
if any record in its training set has DTP greater than 1. However,
what should the data owner do if only a small number of records in
the training dataset violate this hypothesis? It is unsafe to release
the classifier since it contains records vulnerable to membership
inference attacks using techniques like those in Section 5. But it
is natural to ask: Can removing high-risk records from the training
set mitigate the membership privacy risk? The interesting answer is
sometimes yes and sometimes no!
Let us consider a specific example of how removing high-risk
records can influence DTP. The examples in Section 5 are not ideal
because the classifiers trained on the adult dataset already have
low privacy risks, while the classifiers trained on the purchased
dataset are so risky that they are unlikely to be mitigated by simple
mechanisms. We therefore consider a fresh example that fails to
satisfy DTP-1, but not by much. To do this we train a naive Bayes
Figure 6: Effects of Removing Hiigh-Risk Records.
classifier on the 2013 American Community Survey (ACS) dataset.
This dataset has similar attributes as the adult dataset since the adult
dataset was sampled and cleaned from the 1994 Census dataset. We
restrict to four attributes: Age (AGEP), Marital Status (MAR), Race
(RAC1P), and Gender (SEX). As we did with the adult dataset, we
use the salary class (> 50K or ≤ 50K) as the class attribute. We
use all 1.6 million records as our training set. The DTP of the full
dataset is 3.09, indicating vulnerability to membership inference
attacks.
To reduce the DTP in the dataset, we perform the following
simple experiment: First, we measure DTP of each record in the
training set and sort all the records in the decreasing order of their
DTP measurements. Intuitively, the records are sorted in the de-
creasing order of their (initial) privacy risks. Next, we remove these
high-risk records from the training set one at a time. After each
record is removed, we re-calculate the DTP of all records remaining
in the training set and estimate the resulting privacy risk as the
highest DTP in this reduced training set. Figure 6 shows the change
of maximum DTP in the training set when these high-risk records
are removed. Removing the record with the highest risk reduces
the highest DTP in training set from 3.09 to 0.65, greatly reducing
the classifier’s vulnerability to membership attacks and achieving
DTP-1. However, one must not get greedy and think that removing
the next individual will reduce the risk even further. Doing this
takes the DTP back to around 3. Why? Because, unlike the first
individual removed, this second record apparently is needed to
decrease another record’s influence on the target classifier. Indeed,
removing further individuals appears to lead to collections of indi-
viduals that rely on each other to keep DTP down. Their successive
removal creates the sawtooth pattern seen in Figure 6. Based on
this observation, we recommend removing high-risk examples as a
way of reducing DTP and mitigating against membership attacks
when only a few examples in the training set have high privacy
risks. Better understanding of how to reduce DTP is a promising
target for future research.
9 DISCUSSION
In this section, we discuss a few interesting points related to DTP.
Difference betweenDTPandDP. When feasible, using differential
privacy during training is a good strategy to mitigate the risk of
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publishing the model. However, there are cases when differential
privacy cannot be used; either because there is no appropriate
training mechanism or because the data owner cannot afford to
add noise to their models (e.g., in the medical domain). Therefore,
we need a strategy to estimate the privacy risk of the model when
no privacy protections are added. Note that even when differential
privacy is used, DTP can still be used to estimate the privacy risks
before applying differential privacy. With the DTP measurements,
the data owner can understand how much he benefits from using
differential private mechanisms. This information helps balance
the trade-off between utility and privacy.
Unlike DP, DTP is a privacy metric instead of a privacy protec-
tion mechanism. When a machine learning model does not satisfy
differential privacy for any ϵ , little is known about its privacy risk.
However, the metric DTPA,T (t) outputs a value of ϵ for any target
record t and any any classifier A(T ).
Difference between DTP andMembership Attacks. In Section 5,
we show that DTP measurements correlate with the accuracy of
different membership attacks. However, the measurement of DTP
cannot be replaced by running a series of membership attacks. First,
it is computationally inefficient to simulate all possible membership
attacks. Moreover, no matter how much computational power a
data owner has, there may always exist an adversary with superior
computational capability. Second, we cannot rule out the possi-
bility that the adversary knows a stronger a membership attack
than the data owner. As demonstrated in section 5, a record im-
mune to the distance-based membership attack can be vulnerable
to another attack—even a weaker one, overall. Therefore, using a
general privacy metric like DTP to estimate membership privacy is
preferable.
Privacy Risks of Non-Training Stable Classifiers. In Section 6,
we prove that naive Bayes, random decision trees, and linear sta-
tistical queries satisfy training stability but k-NN provably does
not. However, we do not know whether classifiers such as neu-
ral networks and SVMs are training stable. We leave the task of
investigating this question for future work.
Remark that although measuring DTP is computationally infea-
sible for non-training stable models, this does not mean that DTP
metrics are useless for these models. Indeed, as shown in Section 5
PDTP measurements have high correlations with direct member-
ship attacks. The drawback for non-training stable algorithms is
their potential vulnerability to indirect membership attacks. As
future work, we plan to study indirect membership attacks and
ways to mitigate them.
Although DTP doesn’t provide a theoretical privacy guarantee
like DP, we find that it is highly correlated with the performance
of state-of-the-art membership inference techniques. Unlike DP,
which bounds the change in the probability of observing an output
when a record is removed, DTP bounds the magnitude of the differ-
ence caused by removal of a record. In practice, if the magnitude of
this difference is small, it is indistinguishable from the difference
caused by other uncertain factors from the adversary’s perspective.
When attacking machine learning models, these are at least two
sources of uncertainty.
First, in models like neural networks, some parameters such
as weights are initialized randomly. Different initialization states
(a) Prediction on an individual in
low salary class
(b) Prediction on an individual in
high salary class
Figure 7: Prediction variation caused by random
initialization
(a) Prediction on an individual in
low salary class
(b) Prediction on an individual in
high salary class
Figure 8: Prediction variation caused by random sampling
may cause the model to be converged to different local optimals,
so models trained on the same dataset can give slightly different
predictions on the same record. If a record’s DTP is small enough
to be indistinguishable from the difference caused by random ini-
tialization, the record has little privacy risk. Figure 7 shows the
variation in model prediction caused by random initialization. In
the experiment, we train 100 neural network models on the same
training set with 10000 records uniformly sampled from the UCI
Adult dataset. We calculate each model’s prediction on two individ-
uals and plot the histogram of the predicted probability that the
individual has annual salary greater than 50K.
Second, besides the target record, the adversary is also uncer-
tain about what other records are included in the training dataset.
The occurrence of unexpected training records can introduce small
variations in the model’s predcitions. If a record’s DTP is small
enough to be indistinguishable from the variation caused by ran-
dom sampling, the target has little privacy risk. Figure 8 shows
the variation in model prediction caused by random sampling. In
the experiment, we train 100 classifiers on 100 different training
datasets uniformly sampled from the same population. We calculate
each model’s prediction on two individuals and plot the histogram
of the predicted probability that the individual has annual salary
greater than 50K.
10 OPEN QUESTIONS
Experimental results suggest that DTP is a good predictor of the
performance of state-of-art membership inference attacks. However,
it remains an open question if records with low DTP are always
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safe from membership inference attacks. In this section, we discuss
two potential privacy risks for low-DTP records.
DTP-1 Hypothesis. In this paper, we use the DTP-1 hypothesis as
guidance to identify records and classifiers with high privacy risk.
By experimenting with state-of-art membership inference attacks
on machine learning models, we find that when a training record
only has a very small influence on the prediction of a classifier, this
small influence is likely to be indistinguishable from the variation
in prediction due to random sampling of the training records or
random initialization of the weight vectors before training. We
use DTP-1 hypothesis as a rule-of-thumb for determining whether
the influence of a training record is smaller than the influence of
other factors unknown to the adversary, such as randomization in
the training algorithm and existence of unexpected records in the
training set. However, in practice, even when DTP is smaller than
1, the influence of these uncertain factors can be smaller than the
influence of the training record. Therefore, satisfying the DTP-1
hypothesis cannot guarantee that records with DTP smaller than
1 have no privacy risks. With a better understanding on the ad-
versary’s background knowledge and the influence of randomness
in machine learning algorithms, it may be possible to determine a
finer threshold for a safe DTP.
Risk of Indirect Attacks andMultiple Queries. PDTP measures
the privacy risk of directly querying the target record. Based on
experimental validations, we find that training records with low
PDTP are less likely to be vulnerable to direct attacks. However,
models that are not training stable have a potential of leaking the
record’s membership information through other queries, and an
adversary may use this information to perform an indirect attack.
Although we do not know of any practical indirect attacks, it re-
mains an open question to analyze the training stability of some
machine learning models and to design indirect attacks for models
that are not training stable.
Another challenge is to analyze the risk of allowing an adver-
sary to get predictions of multiple queries from the same machine
leanrning model. DTP measures the privacy risk for a single query.
However, if an adversary is allowed to query the target model mul-
tiple times, he may accumulate more information about the target
record t . We leave for future work the study of how this accumu-
lation of information can be used to design stronger membership
inference attacks. Specifically, there are two open questions: (1)
How do we select multiple queries whose results indicate the member-
ship of a target record? (2) How do we estimate an upper bound on
the accuracy of membership inference when an adversary can submit
unlimited number of queries to the model?
11 CONCLUSIONS
In this work, we propose differential training privacy (DTP) as
an empirical metric to estimate the privacy risk of publishing a
classifier. DTP estimates the privacy risk of a training record by
measuring its influence on the predictions of machine learning
models. A large DTP indicates that the record’s influence is strong
enough to indicate its presence in the training dataset. We mea-
sure DTP of popular machine learning models including neural
networks, Naive Bayes, and logistic regressions. We compare these
measurements with the accuracy of different types of membership
inference attacks, including the most effective one in prior works.
Experimental results demontrate that DTP is both efficient and ef-
fective in estimating privacy risks. Specifically, our attacks have at
most 66.5% accuracy (baseline: 50%) on classifiers with DTP-values
under 0.5 and almost always over 90% accuracy on classifiers with
DTP larger than 4. Based on these results, we propose DTP-1 hy-
pothesis as a rule-of-thumb criterion for publishing a classifier: if a
classifier has a DTP value above 1, it should not be published.
Although DTP has a high correlation with the accuracy of a mem-
bership attack, it provides no guarantee about a record’s privacy
protection. Specifically, we propose two potential privacy leakages
for records with low DTP. First, a low-DTP record is vulnerable
to membership inferences when the model’s predictions on it are
unlikely to be influenced by other records or random initializations.
Second, the membership of a low-DTP record might be leaked
by indirect queries or the combination of multiple queries. This
observation can serve as a new direction for designing stronger
membership inference attacks and defenses.
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A PROOFS
Proof of Theorem 6.2. Since (A,T ) is ϵ-PDTP, for all t ∈ T ,
we have
pA(T )(y(t ) | x(t )) ≤ eϵpA(T \{t })(y(t ) | x(t ))
and
pA(T )(y(t ) | x(t )) ≥ e−ϵpA(T \{t })(y(t ) | x(t )).
Since A is δ -training stable on T , for γ = max(δ , eϵ ), we have
pA(T )(y | x) ≤ γpA(T \{t })(y | x)
and
pA(T )(y | x) ≥ γ−1pA(T \{t })(y | x).
Let ϵ ′ = ln(γ ) = max(ln(δ ), ϵ), then
pA(T )(y | x) ≤ eϵ
′
pA(T \{t })(y | x)
and
pA(T )(y | x) ≥ e−ϵ
′
pA(T \{t })(y | x).
Therefore, (A,T ) is ϵ ′-DTP. □
Proof of Proposition 6.3. Let T ′ = T \ {t}. Let A(T ) and
A(T ′) be two Naive Bayes classification models separately learned
on dataset T and T ′, and N be the number of records in T . We use
nx,y to represent the number of records with the feature vector x
and the class label y, and use nx to represent the number of records
in T with feature vector x. For all x ∈ Xm , for all y ∈ Y , so that
nx,y > 1 and nx > 1, we have
pA(T )(y | x) =
nx,y
nx
.
When x , x(t ),
pA(T \{t })(y | x) = pA(T )(y | x). (2)
When x = x(t ) and y , y(t ),
pA(T \{t })(y | x(t )) =
nx(t ),y
nx(t ) − 1
.
Therefore,
pA(T )(y | x(t ))
pA(T \{t })(y | x(t ))
=
nx(t ) − 1
nx(t )
< 1. (3)
When x = x(t ) and y = y(t ),
pA(T \{t })(y(t ) | x(t )) =
nx(t ),y (t ) − 1
nx(t ) − 1
.
Therefore,
pA(T )(y(t ) | x(t ))
pA(T \{t })(y(t ) | x(t ))
=
nx(t ),y (t )
nx(t )
(nx(t ),y (t ) − 1
nx(t ) − 1
)−1
=
nx(t ),y (t )nx(t ) − nx(t ),y (t )
nx(t ),y (t )nx(t ) − nx(t )
.
Since
nx(t ),y (t ) ≤ nx(t ) ,
we have
pA(T )(y(t ) | x(t ))
pA(T \{t })(y(t ) | x(t ))
≥ 1. (4)
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From equations 2, 3, and 4, we have for all x ∈ Xm , for all y ∈ Y ,
pA(T )(y | x)
pA(T \{t })(y | x)
≤ pA(T )(y
(t ) | x(t ))
pA(T \{t })(y(t ) | x(t ))
.
Therefore, it suffices to prove
pA(T )(y | x)
pA(T \{t })(y | x)
≥
(
max(43 ,
pA(T )(y(t ) | x(t ))
pA(T \{t })(y(t ) | x(t ))
)
)−1
,
which is equivalent to
nx(t )
nx(t ) − 1
≤ max(43 ,
nx(t ),y (t )
nx(t ),y (t ) − 1
nx(t ) − 1
nx(t )
).
Let a = nx(t ),y (t ) and b = nx(t ) . Then a < b. By solving
b
b − 1 >
b − 1
b
a
a − 1 ,
we get
b > a +
√
4a(a − 1)
2 .
Let b∗ = ⌈a +
√
4a(a−1)
2 ⌉, then b∗min = 4. Since bb−1 is a decreasing
function of b, when bb−1 >
b−1
b
a
a−1 , we have
b
b − 1 ≤
b∗min
b∗min − 1
=
4
3 .
Therefore,
nx(t )
nx(t ) − 1
≤ max(43 ,
nx(t ),y (t )
nx(t ),y (t ) − 1
nx(t ) − 1
nx(t )
).
Bayes inference algorithm is 43 -training stable. □
Proof of Proposition 6.4. Let T ′ = T \ {t}. Let A(T ) and
A(T ′) be two Bayesian classification models separately learned
on dataset T and T ′, and N be the number of records in T . For
simplification, we use p(xi | y) and p′(xi | y) to represent the
conditional probability that the i-th feature equals to xi given the
class label equals y inT andT ′, and use p(y) and p′(y) to represent
probability that the class label equals y in T and T ′. We use nxi ,y
to represent the number of records with the i-th feature xi and the
class label y, and use ny to represent the number of records in T
with label y.
According to the conditional independence assumption of Naive
Bayes, we have
p(y | x)
p′(y | x) =
∏m
i=1 p(xi | y)p(y)∏m
i=1 p′(xi | y)p′(y)
=
m∏
i=1
p(xi | y)
p′(xi | y)
p(y)
p′(y) . (5)
First, we prove that
p(y(t ) | x(t ))
p′(y(t ) | x(t )) ≥ 1.
Since p′(y(t ) | x(t )) > 0, based on Equation 5, we have p′(x (t )i |
y(t )) > 0, and p′(y) > 0.
p(x (t )i | y(t ))
p′(x (t )i | y(t ))
=
n
x (t )i ,y (t )
(
ny (t ) − 1
)
ny (t )
(
n
x (t )i ,y (t )
− 1
)
=
n
x (t )i ,y (t )
ny (t ) − nx (t )i ,y (t )
n
x (t )i ,y (t )
ny (t ) − ny (t )
.
Since
n
x (t )i ,y (t )
≤ ny (t ) ,
we have
p(x (t )i | y(t ))
p′(x (t )i | y(t ))
≥ 1. (6)
Similarly
p(y)
p′(y) =
p(y(t ))
p′(y(t )) =
ny (t )N − ny (t )
ny (t )N − N
≥ 1.
Therefore,
p(y(t ) | x(t ))
p′(y(t ) | x(t )) =
m∏
i=1
p(x (t )i | y)
p′(x (t )i | y)
p(y(t ))
p′(y(t )) ≥ 1. (7)
Next, we prove that Naive Bayes classification algorithm is δ -
training stable on T , for
δ =
(
nymin
nymin − 1
)m−1 n
n − 1 .
We start with the case when y , y(t ). Since, nxi ,y and ny does not
change after the removal of d , we have
p(xi | y)
p′(xi | y) = 1.
And,
p(y)
p′(y) =
ny
n
( ny
n − 1
)−1
=
n − 1
n
.
Therefore, when y , y(t )
p(y | x)
p′(y | x) =
m∏
i=1
p(xi | y)
p′(xi | y)
p(y | x)
p′(y | x) =
n − 1
n
< 1.
According to equation 7, we have
p(y | x)
p′(y | x) <
p(y(t ) | x(t ))
p′(y(t ) | x(t )) .
Since
n − 1
n
>
(
nymin − 1
nymin
)m−1 n − 1
n
≥ δ−1,
we have
δ−1 < p(y | x)p′(y | x) <
p(y(t ) | x(t ))
p′(y(t ) | x(t )) .
We then consider the case when y = y(t ).
When xi = x (t )i ,
p(xi | y(t ))
p′(xi | y(t ))
=
p(x (t )i | y(t ))
p′(x (t )i | y(t ))
≥ 1. (8)
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When xi , x (t )i ,
p(xi | y(t ))
p′(xi | y(t ))
=
ny (t ) − 1
ny (t )
< 1. (9)
According to Equation 6, we have
p(xi | y(t ))
p′(xi | y(t ))
=
ny (t ) − 1
ny (t )
<
p(x (t )i | y(t ))
p′(x (t )i | y(t ))
.
Therefore,
p(y(t ) | x)
p′(y(t ) | x) =
m∏
i=1
p(xi | y(t ))
p′(xi | y(t ))
p(y(t ))
p′(y(t ))
≤
m∏
i=1
p(x (t )i | y(t ))
p′(x (t )i | y(t ))
p(y(t ))
p′(y(t ))
=
p(y(t ) | x(t ))
p′(y(t ) | x(t )) .
From Equation 8 and 9, we have
m∏
i=1
p(xi | y(t ))
p′(xi | y(t ))
≥
(
ny (t ) − 1
ny (t )
)m
Since
p(y(t ))
p′(y(t )) =
ny (t ) (n − 1)
n(ny (t ) − 1)
=
ny (t )
ny (t ) − 1
n − 1
n
,
we have
p(y(t ) | x)
p′(y(t ) | x) =
m∏
i=1
p(xi | y)
p′(xi | y)
p(y(t ))
p′(y(t ))
≥
(
ny (t ) − 1)
ny (t )
)m−1
n − 1
n
≥ δ−1.
Hence,
δ−1 ≤ p(y
(t ) | x)
p′(y(t ) | x) ≤
p(y(t ) | x(t ))
p′(y(t ) | x(t )) .
Let γ = max
(
δ ,
p(y (t ) |x(t ))
p′(y (t ) |x(t ))
)
, then
γ−1 ≤ p(y | x)p′(y | x) ≤ γ .
□
Proof of Proposition 6.8. Let p′1(y | x), p′2(y | x), . . . , p′k (y |
x) be the predictions given by each random decision tree learned
on T \ {t}. Then for 1 ≤ k ≤ K , we have
pk (y | x)
p′k (y | x)
≤ max
(
4
3 ,
pk (y(t ) | x(t ))
p′K (y(t ) | x(t ))
)
Therefore,
pA(T )(y | x)
pA(T \{t })(y | x)
=
( K∏
k=1
pk (y | x)
p′k (y | x)
) 1
K
≤max
(
4
3 ,
pA(T )(y(t ) | x(t ))
pA(T \{t })(y(t ) | x(t ))
)
□
Proof of Theorem 6.9. According to Lipschitz condition, for
all x ∈ Xm , for all t ∈ T , we haveCuT (x) −Cu−tT (x)∞ ≤ L uT − u−tT ∞ ≤ ϵL.
That is, for all y ∈ Y ,logpA(T )(y | x) − logpA(T \{t })(y | x) ≤ ϵL.
Therefore, for all x ∈ Xm , for all y ∈ Y ,
e−ϵL ≤ pA(T )(y | x)
pA(T \{t })(y | x)
≤ eϵL .
That is, for all t ∈ T ,
DTPA,T (t) ≤ ϵ · L.
□
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